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A mental state is conscious just in case there is something it is like to be in it. The properties in 
virtue of which there is something it is like to be in a mental state are phenomenal properties, or 
qualia. A mental state is intentional just in case it is about something, and thereby has truth or 
veridicality conditions. The feature of an intentional state in virtue of which it has these prop-
erties is called its intentional content. In analytic philosophy of mind there was for many years a 
consensus that consciousness and intentionality are properties of metaphysically exclusive kinds. 
Conscious qualitative states, such as visual, auditory and olfactory experiences, do not, per se, 
have intentional content; and intentional states, such as thoughts, beliefs, desires and intentions 
do not, qua intentional, have phenomenal properties. To be sure, perceptual states such as seeing a 
dog or hearing it bark are perceptions of dogs and barks, and thereby have intentional content. 
But their intentionality was typically taken to be determined by causal relations between per-
ceiver and perceived, and not by any intrinsic qualitative features they might have. And though 
thoughts, beliefs and desire may be conscious, whatever qualitative features might be associated 
with thinking, believing and desiring were taken to be irrelevant to their intentional content. In 
general, the phenomenal character of conscious states was seen as having no essential connection 
to their intentional contents.
Consciousness is extremely difficult (some think impossible) to explain within the naturalist 
framework that has prevailed in analytic philosophy of mind for most of the twentieth century, 
and into the twenty-first. Intentionality, on the other hand, insofar as it is a phenomenon that is 
not essentially tied to consciousness, was seen to be more tractable, and various theories ground-
ing it in or reducing it to natural relations between the brain and the world it represents were 
proposed and developed. Philosophers working on intentionality, both perceptual and cognitive, 
felt they could safely ignore the vexing problem of the naturalization of consciousness.
More recently, however, this consensus has begun to weaken, as naturalistic theories of inten-
tionality have faced problems that a growing number of philosophers believe are due to their 
failure to take conscious qualitative experience into account. These philosophers have argued 
that intentionality is essentially an experiential phenomenon, and, as such, cannot be reductively 
explained unless consciousness can – however problematic this may be for the naturalistic pro-
gram in philosophy of mind. They have taken a stance reminiscent of classical phenomenology, 
which “brackets” the relation of experience to the world in order to study it on its own terms. 
These analytic phenomenologists tend to bracket the relation between experience and the brain, 
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pursuing a phenomenal theory of intentionality free from, as Charles Siewert (2011: 242) so 
memorably put it, “the tyrannizing anxieties and ambitions of mind-body metaphysics.” While 
not ignoring the metaphysical problem of consciousness, these analytic phenomenologists insist 
that reductive explanation is not the only project one might profitably pursue in the study of 
consciousness.
1 Causal-Informational Psychosemantics
Fred Dretske was set to be the Darwin of intentionality. His insight that causal relations, inso-
far as they carry information about the occurrence of the events they relate, establish a kind of 
proto-intentionality, is profound. It is the kind of idea – intuitive, simple and powerful – we all 
wish we had thought of (and wonder why we didn’t).1 Though not yet what we have, this proto-
intentionality is sufficiently like it to get us a conceptual foot in the seemingly unopenable door 
between this aspect of mind and our physical constitution. Dretske’s idea promised to show how 
it is possible that a highly sophisticated and puzzling aspect of our mental nature could arise from 
simple beginnings, by entirely natural processes.
In the 1980s and ’90s there was, understandably, a great deal of excitement among analytic 
philosophers of mind over this idea. Jerry Fodor went as far as to suggest that (modulo a syn-
tactic solution to Frege’s Puzzle) “Turing and Dretske have between them solved the mind/
body problem” (Fodor 1994: 56). Turing showed how a physical thing could reason, and Dretske 
showed how a physical thing could represent. The philosophical project of naturalizing the 
mind, of bringing it within the scope of the kind of empirical methodology that led to such 
spectacular successes in our understanding of the world, seemed to be, if not complete, at least 
halfway there.
The view has the added benefit of building a connection between thought and its objects 
into the very nature of representational content. Concepts are individuated by the object(s) or 
property instantiation(s) whose presence is lawfully causally correlated with their occurrence, 
and thus acquire their contents and their extensions simultaneously.
There was (as Dretske and Fodor were always well aware) still the problem of consciousness 
to be addressed. Causal relations per se do not seem to be sufficient to bring about conscious 
experience, or even some kind of proto-conscious experience. Qualia freaks would have to 
await their own Darwin. But the other half of the mind-body problem was, from a philosophical 
point of view, in its essential outlines, thought to have been solved.
Philosophy being philosophy, of course there were dissenters all along. In particular, there 
have been those, such as John Searle and Galen Strawson, who have long insisted that genuine 
intentionality (what we have) is essentially a conscious, experiential phenomenon. Searle has 
argued for what he calls the “connection principle” (Searle 1992), according to which a mental 
state cannot have fine-grained intentional content (what he calls “aspectual shape”) unless it 
is either conscious or potentially conscious,2 and Strawson (1994) has argued for the essential 
experientiality of mentality in general, and of conceptual intentionality in particular. According 
to these theorists, resources sufficient for constructing an information processor are not sufficient 
for constructing a mind, since information per se is not conscious, and consciousness is required 
for genuine intentionality. Another important defender of this idea is Charles Siewert (1998).
Causal-informational theorists have, unsurprisingly, resisted this claim. If true, it would 
short-circuit their naturalistic explanation of intentionality, since at present there is no adequate 
naturalistic account of conscious experience (and some would argue that there can never be 
one). Fodor even pronounced commitment to an essential link between intentionality and 
conscious experience “intellectual suicide.”3 But, as we will see, it is a position that has recently 
RHOC.indb   261 21-02-2018   20:04:41
David Pitt
262
been  gaining adherents in analytic philosophy of mind, who so far appear to have remained 
 intellectually above ground.
In spite of their promise, causal-informational theories face internal difficulties – the most 
persistent of which have been problems of indeterminacy. There is Quine’s Problem, which arises 
out of what may be called causal superimposition; the Disjunction Problem, which arises out of what 
may be called causal spread; and the Stopping Problem, which arises out of what may be called 
causal depth. In all of these cases, there are multiple candidates for content determiner/extension, 
and no obvious way to choose among them derivable from the basic machinery of the theory.
Quinean examples of indeterminacy of radical translation (Quine 1960) can be taken to show 
that for any property that is a candidate for determining the content of a concept (the meaning 
of a term), there are indefinitely many other simultaneously instantiated (superimposed) proper-
ties that cannot be teased apart causally. Any instantiation of rabbithood, for example, is also, neces-
sarily, an instantiation of undetached-rabbit-parts-hood, rabbit-stage-hood, and indefinitely many other 
properties. Assuming that these properties are distinct, they are candidates for distinct contents for 
the meaning of ‘rabbit’ (and the concept [mental representation] rabbit). (Names for concepts 
are here written in small caps, and names of properties in italics.) Given that these properties are 
(at least physically) necessarily instantiated by the same things, there can be no lawful relations 
between mental states and one of them that are not also lawful relations between mental states and 
all of them. Hence, a causal-informational theory cannot, at least prima facie, assign one of them as 
the content of rabbit. There is by the theory’s lights no fact of the matter about which of these 
properties is content-determinative of the concept rabbit (the term ‘rabbit’).
Though Quinean examples can be taken to show as entailing indeterminacy of content, they 
can also be viewed as entailing massive disjunctiveness of content. On this construal, the content 
of rabbit would be rabbithood or undetached-rabbit-parts-hood or rabbit-stage-hood or .... In this case 
there would be a fact of the matter about what the content of a given concept is, but it would 
be, counterintuitively, open-endedly disjunctive. This is problematic because, as Fodor has often 
pointed out (e.g., Fodor 1987), there ought to be psychological generalizations that apply to 
mental states in virtue of their content. However, in keeping with the naturalistic project, such 
laws would be causal (or otherwise nomological). But natural laws typically are not formulated 
in terms of disjunctive properties, which do not in general constitute natural kinds.
Dretske (1981) himself recognized this problem (named the “Disjunction Problem” in Fodor 
1984), which arises from the fact that there are causal correlations between the occurrence 
of mental representations and the presence of a wide range of things (property instantiations) 
that are, intuitively, not in the extension of those representations. Thus, though there may be a 
law-like regularity between horses (instantiations of horsehood) and occurrences of the concept 
horse, such relations also hold between horse occurrences and indefinitely many other things: 
donkeys on dark nights, zebras in the mist, merest ripples in horse-infested waters,4 ... – anything that 
might cause one to think, correctly or incorrectly, (e.g.) lo, a horse! Thus, for horse (or any 
empirical concept), there is a spread of different property instantiations (by distinct objects) suf-
ficient for its tokening, and, hence, by the theory’s lights, sufficient for determining its content. 
But horse cannot mean all of these indefinitely many things. And the reasons for resisting a 
disjunctive content are the same here as they were in the causal superimposition cases.
Indeed, though this is not always remarked upon, one could just as well construe this as a 
problem of indeterminacy: there is, consistent with the resources of the theory, no fact of the 
matter about which one of the indefinitely many causally correlated property instantiations 
determine a concept’s content.
Another problem (named the “Stopping Problem” in Strawson 2008) first arises when the 
causal relations that are supposed to establish content hold between mental states and distal 
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objects.5 Thus, causal relations to cows – instantiations of cowhood – are supposed to constitute a 
mental representation the concept cow. But there are also causal relations between occurrences 
of cow and any link in the causal chain between cows and cows. These include links within the 
perceptual system, such as bovine retinal images, bovine olfactory bulb stimulations, bovine visual or olfac-
tory cortex activation patterns, etc.,6 as well as links between retinal images (or other sensory-organ 
representations) and cows – such as cow reflections, cow shadows, cow breezes, .... There are also less 
obvious candidates, like photons reflected from a cow, the cow’s parents, distant ancestor bovine species, ..., 
the Big Bang. All of these can lay equal claim to inclusion in the causal chain leading to tokenings 
of cow, although, obviously, the vast majority of them are not plausible candidates for being (or 
determining) the content or extension of the concept cow.
The causal chains connecting concept tokenings to their content-conferring property instan-
tiations are deep, involving a densely packed series of property instantiations (events) as links. 
And while we may find it impossible to take seriously candidates such as objects or events in the 
distant past, or property instantiations undetectable by us, if all we have at our disposal is causal 
relations, it is not obvious what principled reasons there could be for excluding any of them. 
And if there is no way to prune away the unwanted causes, then we are faced, as with the other 
problematic cases, with the invidious choice between indeterminacy and massive disjunction.7
And there are other apparent problems, as well: How are causal theories to explain the con-
tents of mathematical, logical and other concepts, whose referents are abstract, causally-inert 
objects? Or the contents of concepts of non-existent objects?
Causal-informational theorists have expended considerable effort and ingenuity in the search 
for a solution to these problems (see e.g. Dretske 1988, 1995; Fodor 1987, 1990; Millikan 1984, 
1989; Neander 1995; Papineau 1998; Prinz 2002; Rupert 1999, to cite just a few examples from 
a very large literature). Some see a solution in teleology – the evolved function of representa-
tion-producing mechanisms; though there are residual indeterminacy problems for such views 
(see Fodor 1990). Others appeal to causal-inferential relations among mental representations 
(see Block 1986; Field 1977; Harman 1973, 1987; Loar 1981; and McGinn 1982 for founda-
tional statements of the view). These “conceptual-,” “functional-,” or “inferential-role” theories 
are typically integrated with Dretske-style accounts in constructing “two-factor” (internal and 
external, “narrow” and “wide”) theories of content. These theories have their own technical 
difficulties, arising from their prima facie commitment to meaning holism (see e.g. Fodor and 
Lepore (1992). (An intuitive objection to such views is that inferential relations among concepts 
are determined by their contents, not vice versa.) But it would not be accurate to say that natu-
ralistic approaches of these kinds are defunct.8
2 Phenomenal Intentionality
Other philosophers have proposed that in order to solve these problems – or, even better, to 
avoid them entirely – causal relations should be replaced with (or at the very least supple-
mented by) qualitative features of experience as determiners of content. Searle and Strawson 
have already been mentioned as early analytic proponents of an experience-based approach 
to intentionality.9 Searle (1987) responds to Quinean indeterminacy; and Strawson addresses 
the Stopping Problem in his 2008. It has also been argued that phenomenology can solve the 
Disjunction Problem (Pitt 2009; Horgan and Graham 2012).
The shared idea is that what our concepts are concepts of is what we take them to be of, where 
taking is a manner of experiencing. What horse means is what we mean by it; and what we mean 
is experiential, and introspectively available to us. We know, from a first-person perspective, that 
the extension of horse is horses, and not horse-part-fusions or zebras in the mist or equine retinal 
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arrays, ....10 And we know this in this way because conceptual contents (and thought contents) 
are experiential in nature.
Searle calls the experiential content of a concept its “aspectual shape.” Strawson (1994) calls 
it “understanding experience.” Siewert (2011) speaks of “phenomenal thought.”11 It has lately 
come to be known as “cognitive phenomenology” (Pitt 2004; Bayne and Montague 2011a; 
Chudnoff 2015a; see Strawson 1986 for an early use of this term). Without claiming that every-
one who subscribes to this view agrees about the nature of conceptual experience and its rela-
tion to intentional mental content (some theorists claim that it does not determine content at 
all [Siewert 1998], some say it constitutes only an internally determined component of content 
[Horgan and Kriegel 2008; Strawson 2008], while others reject the idea that content should be 
factored into internally and externally determined components [Pitt 2013]), we can say that 
there is a shared commitment to the thesis that genuine conceptual intentionality of the kind 
we have is essentially an experiential phenomenon. Without experience (which for most phi-
losophers means without consciousness) there can be no mental representation with the fineness 
of grain or selectivity that our thoughts and concepts display.
Apart from its value as a prophylactic (or cure) for Indeterministic Disjunctivitis, conceptual 
phenomenology has been recommended on independent grounds.
One common form of argument is from phenomenal contrast. In one kind of case, we are 
invited to compare the experience of hearing discourse in a language that is understood to the 
experience of discourse in a language that is not understood (Strawson 1994: 5–6). In another, we 
are invited to consider changes in our own conscious occurrent thought (Siewert 1998: 275–278). 
In yet another, we are to imagine an individual who lacks all sensory, emotional, algedonic, etc., 
experience, yet who can still think, and consider what it is like for this individual to reason math-
ematically (Kriegel 2015: 56–62). In all cases, it is argued that there is a phenomenal difference, 
a difference in what it’s like for the thinker, and, further, that this is not a difference in familiar 
kinds of phenomenology, such as that of verbal or auditory imagery, emotional tone, etc. It is then 
concluded that there is an irreducible, distinctively cognitive kind of experience that accompanies 
(or constitutes) thinking, differences in which account for the experiential contrasts.12
Phenomenal contrast arguments are vulnerable to competing claims about what the contrast 
between experiences with and without understanding actually consists in. What proponents 
attribute to a difference in cognitive phenomenology, critics maintain is a difference in audi-
tory, visual, emotional, or some other more familiar kind of phenomenology. Such positions are 
bolstered by claims of a lack of introspective evidence in the objector’s own experience for the 
existence of such sui generis cognitive phenomenology.13 Disputes over what is phenomenally 
manifest in introspection are notoriously difficult (though not impossible) to adjudicate. This has 
led some to doubt whether the phenomenal contrast strategy is the best way to try to establish 
the existence of cognitive phenomenology. (Sacchi and Voltolini [2016] offer a version of the 
contrast argument that, they claim, does not rely on introspection.)
A different sort of approach, due to Strawson, focuses on the significance or value of conscious 
experience in general, and of conscious thought in particular. Strawson (2011) argues that our 
conscious experience would be significantly less interesting if it did not include an experience 
of thinking. If thoughts were just unconscious subpersonal computational states, our conscious 
mental lives would be drastically impoverished. We would have no experience of grasping truths, 
of wondering why something is the case, of realizing and solving problems, etc.
Another type of argument for cognitive phenomenology appeals to a particular kind of 
self-knowledge we are capable of. Pitt (2004) argues that it is possible to know, consciously, 
introspectively and non-inferentially, what one is consciously occurrently thinking, and that this 
would not be possible if thought (and conceptual) contents were not immediately present in 
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consciousness. Just as one can know in this way that one is hungry, hearing a trumpet or tasting 
ashes, because there is something it is like to be in these states, one can know that one is think-
ing, and what one is thinking, because there is something it is like to think, and what it is like to 
think thoughts with different contents is phenomenally different. Conscious occurrent thoughts 
could not be introspectively distinguished from other kinds of conscious states, and from each 
other, in this way if they were not phenomenally individuated. Moreover, since it is possible to 
have auditory or visual experience of linguistic expressions without thinking what they mean, 
or thinking anything at all, this individuative phenomenology cannot be the phenomenology of 
inner speech or visualization.
Pitt (2009) argues, further, that this cognitive kind of phenomenology is cognitive inten-
tional content. To consciously think that three is a prime number is to consciously token a 
maximally determinate cognitive-phenomenal type which is the proposition that three is a 
prime number. (Just as to be in a maximally determinate pain state is to token a maximally 
determinate pain type.)
Pitt (2011) offers another argument for cognitive phenomenology, based upon the claim 
that conscious states, as such, are individuated phenomenologically. That is, what distinguishes 
conscious states of different kinds is their different kinds of phenomenal character. Conscious 
sensory states, such as visual, auditory and olfactory experiences, are distinguished by, respec-
tively, visual, auditory and olfactory phenomenology, each a sui generis kind of experiential 
quality. And conscious sensory states within a given modality are, as such, individuated by dif-
ferent determinate phenomenologies within their respective determinable phenomenal kinds. 
Pitt argues that conscious thought, qua conscious, is individuated in the same way as other kinds 
of conscious experience, as are distinct thoughts within the cognitive experiential modality. 
Hence, there must be a proprietary, distinctive and individuative phenomenology of occurrent 
conscious thought.
Perceptual states are also intentional. In their various modalities, they represent to us the 
world around us, providing information about the existence and states of the things with which 
we interact. And they can be more or less accurate, veridical or not. What is the role of con-
sciousness in the intentionality of perception? Obviously, conscious perceptual experiences must 
be conscious. But what role do the phenomenal properties apparent in conscious experience 
play in determining the intentional content of a perceptual state – what it is a perception of? 
On what can be called the Pure Causal View, they play no role whatever. A perceptual state is a 
representation of an object or property (instantiation) if and only if it is caused by that object or 
property. Whatever qualitative properties may be consciously apparent determine, at best, only 
how accurately or inaccurately a perceptual state represents, not whether or not it represents. 
Toward the other end is what Montague (2016) calls the Matching View, according to which 
there is a (probably vague) limit to how badly a perceptual state can misrepresent its cause before 
it ceases to be a perception of it.
Most (if not all) philosophers would agree that a causal relation between token perceptual 
states and specific objects or properties is necessary for genuine perception. No state not caused 
by an elephant is a perception of an elephant. The role of causation with respect to perceptual 
states is thus different from its role with respect to cognitive (conceptual) states. In the latter case, 
we want to allow that token concepts can be of things that are not their token causes. A token 
concept elephant should be a concept of elephants (have elephants in its extension), no matter 
what causes it, and whether or not it was caused by any external thing or property. But a token 
perceptual state cannot be a perception of an elephant unless it is caused by an elephant. Because 
of this difference, the Disjunction Problem does not arise for perceptual states. Perceptions of 
elephants cannot be caused by hippos-in-the-mist or large grey rocks, or by nothing at all.
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Quine’s problem also does not arise for perceptual states, since, for example, a perceptual state 
caused by an elephant is also caused by an elephant-stage and a sum of undetached elephant 
parts, etc. The conceptual distinctions do not seem to be relevant to what is being perceived in the 
way they are relevant to what is being thought about.
But the Stopping Problem does arise. Any state caused by an F is also caused by other links 
in the causal chain leading to the occurrence of the state. A visual perception of an elephant 
is caused by the elephant; but it is also caused by whatever caused the elephant, the photons 
reflected from the elephant, the firing of cells in the retina, the lateral geniculate nuclei and the 
primary visual cortex, etc. – none of which we would want to say the experience is of.
The Matching View has a straightforward solution to this problem: the visual experience 
one has upon looking at an elephant is not an experience of any of these other causes because 
it does not resemble any of them. This is analogous to the cognitive-phenomenal solution to the 
Quine and Disjunction Problems for conceptual representations – the concepts rabbit and 
rabbit-stage, horse and cow-in-the-mist, are introspectively distinguishable cognitive experi-
ences. What it is like to think that something is a rabbit is different from what it is like to think 
that it is a rabbit-stage.
Some philosophers (e.g. Evans 1982 and Dretske 2006) have argued that in order for a state 
to be a perception of an F, it must not just be caused by an F, but also enable the perceiver to 
locate or track the F. And this might seem to be enough to solve the perceptual Stopping Problem, 
since the state of perceiving an elephant does not provide the perceiver information about the 
location of the elephant’s ancestors, the photons bouncing off it, the perceiver’s retina, or parts 
of the perceiver’s brain. Moreover, since on this account the state itself need not (at least for 
Dretske) be phenomenally conscious, it need not resemble its cause in any robust sense. And even 
if it is acknowledged that perceptual states are typically conscious, and that conscious states have 
(or present) qualitative properties, one may allow that these properties establish whether or not 
the state resembles its cause, but still deny that resemblance is necessary for genuine perception.
Montague insists, however, that there are limits to how badly a conscious perceptual state 
can misrepresent its cause before it is disqualified as a perception of it. On her Matching View, a 
perceptual state “must represent a sufficient number of [an] object’s properties correctly in order 
for it to be true that one [perceives] it” (Montague 2016: 156). On this view, an experience that 
in no way resembles an elephant cannot be a perception of the elephant that caused it.
The intuitions on both sides are respectable. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to say that 
an experience caused by an F is a perception of that F no matter how unlike its cause it is – just 
as it seems reasonable to say that a photograph is of an F if it was photons bouncing off the F 
that were responsible for its production (cf. Evans 1982, 78), no matter how little it resembles 
its cause; or a painting is a painting of an F if the artist intended it to be a painting of an F, no 
matter how little it might resemble the F (cf. modern art).
On the other hand, if we consider things from the perspective of the representation 
itself, it seems reasonable to say that resemblance is required. No one shown a picture of an 
elephant would take it to be a picture of a pink Cadillac, or vice versa. And no one would 
take a completely blank image to be a photograph of either an elephant or a pink Cadillac. 
Moreover, it seems entirely natural to say that an image with the appropriate properties is 
an image of an elephant, whether or not it resulted from causal interaction with one, and 
somewhat perverse to say that such an image is not an image of an elephant, because it was 
not caused by one.
These intuitions are not inconsistent. There is a perfectly good sense of ‘a perception of an 
F ’ on which it means a perception caused by an F, and an equally good sense on which it means a 
perception resembling an F. The latter sense is commonly marked out with the phrase ‘perception as 
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of an F ’ (or of an F as an F ). A perception of an F (like a photograph or picture of an F ) may or 
may not also be a perception as of an F. Being caused by an F does not entail, and is not entailed 
by, resembling an F. A state caused by an elephant could resemble virtually anything, or nothing 
at all; and a state resembling an elephant could be caused by virtually anything, or nothing at 
all. (Additionally, the former sense may be used in reference to a perception [or photograph or 
painting] of a particular F, the latter in reference to a perception [or photograph or painting] of 
a typical F, though none in particular.)
However, if the issue is the intentionality of perceptual experience itself, then it is arguable 
that the latter sense of ‘perception of ’ is more appropriate. For the content of perceptual experi-
ence as one has it is constituted by its phenomenal character. Perceivers do not have direct access 
to external causal relations between objects and their perceptions of them. And if the role of 
perception is to inform perceivers of the existence and states of external objects, then complete 
misrepresentation of its external cause should disqualify an experience as a genuine perception, 
since such an experience would be (more or less) useless to the perceiver.
Dretske and others (e.g. Dretske 1995; Harman 1990; Lycan 1996; Tye 2000) have proposed 
extensions of the casual-informational theory to give a naturalistic account of the qualitative 
properties apparent to us in perceptual experience. Such “reductive representationalist” views 
(see Chalmers 2004 for terminological clarification) attempt to explain the phenomenology of 
perception in terms of causal-informational representation of objectively instantiated phenom-
enal properties. The yellowness one might mention in describing what it is like to see a ripe 
banana, for instance, is a property of the banana, not one’s experience of it. And it is easy to see 
how this account could be used to solve the Stopping Problem for perception: a perceptual state 
represents the thing whose phenomenal properties are apparent to the perceiver. However, this 
“qualia externalism” (see Byrne and Tye 2006) faces serious problems in accounting for dreams, 
illusions and hallucinations (Thompson 2008; Pitt 2017). (Moreover, it is far from obvious how 
externalist theories of this kind could solve the indeterminacy problems for cognitive states. See 
Byrne 2011, 2008 and Pitt 2011.)
3 Conclusion
There is a common point to be made about the role of phenomenology in determining con-
ceptual and perceptual intentionality (content). A theory that takes causal-informational rela-
tions between representation and represented to be sufficient to determine the content of the 
representation (what the representation is about) will encounter indeterminacy/disjunction 
problems that cannot be solved in purely causal-informational terms. The diagnosis offered by 
advocates of phenomenal intentionality is that such difficulties are bound to arise whenever 
the intrinsic properties of representations are ignored. Such properties have an essential role 
in both determining representational contents and making them available to the thinker or 
perceiver. If thought and perception are to establish useful and accurate representational con-
nections between conscious thinker-perceivers and their worlds, it must be apparent to them 
what is being represented and how it is being represented, and how a thing is represented must 
sufficiently resemble (accurately characterize) what it represents. In consciousness, appearance 
is, necessarily, phenomenal. Nothing can appear to a thinker-perceiver without appearing 
in some way or other, and the ways of appearing are constituted by phenomenal properties. 
And nothing can be accurately and (hence) usefully conceived or perceived unless the way 
it appears to the thinker-perceiver is the way it is. In spite of the fact that consciousness and 
phenomenality stubbornly resist naturalistic explanation, no theory of intentionality can afford 
to ignore them.
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Notes
 1 See Dretske (1981, 1988, 1995). C.B. Martin had a different, but also inspired, idea when he noticed 
that the relation between dispositions and their manifestations can also be seen as a kind of proto-
intentionality. Dispositional states are directed at, indicate, or point to, their manifestations. See Martin 
(2008).
 2 See Fodor and Lepore (1994) and Gennaro 2012 (sec. 2.3.1) for critical discussion of Searle’s connec-
tion principle. Searle (1984) also objected to the idea that Turing solved the naturalization problem for 
reasoning, arguing that rule-governed symbol-manipulation without understanding (for Searle, a form 
of experience) is not thinking.
 3 I am not aware of this remark appearing in print. I have heard Fodor say it, and Strawson reports it in 
2008.
 4 Cf. Fodor (1990).
 5 As Strawson notes, this is a common problem for causal theories generally (e.g., the causal theory of 
perception, to be discussed below).
 6 As pointed out also in Sterelny (1990), Antony and Levine (1991), Adams and Aizawa (1997) and Fodor 
(1990).
 7 The Stopping Problem has also been called the “horizontal disjunction problem.” The three problems 
discussed here are really versions of a general problem that we might call the “Problem of Causal 
Proliferation.”
 8 Philosophical views are rarely, if ever, definitively defunct. What usually happens is that people get 
bored with their problems and move on to something else. Often enough, old views get resurrected 
once new ones become stale.
 9 In the Phenomenological tradition, the experiential nature of intentionality is taken to be self-evident.
10 Indeed, as has often been pointed out, if we could make no such distinctions as those between the 
contents rabbit and rabbit-stage, indeterminacy and disjunction would not appear to us to be problems at 
all. Of course, Quine famously denied that, after all, there is a difference between rabbit and rabbit-stage 
for the radical translator. But, as Searle (1987) argued, this strains credibility (to say the least). It seems 
more plausible to see Quinean indeterminacy as a reductio of empiricist semantics.
11 See also the discussion of the experience of thinking in Siewert (1998, ch. 8).
12 Other proponents of this kind of argument include Horgan and Graham (2012), Horgan and Tienson 
(2002), Moore (1962), Peacocke (1998) and Siewert (1998, 2011).
13 See, e.g., Carruthers and Veillet (2011), Chudnoff (2015b), Koksvik (2015), Levine (2011), Pautz (2013), 
Prinz (2011) and Tye and Wright (2011).
References
Adams, F. R. and Aizawa, K. (1997) “Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal 
Projections,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 433–437.
Antony, L. and Levine, J. (1991) “The Nomic and the Robust,” in B. M. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning 
in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell.
Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds.) (2011) Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (2011a) “Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction,” in Bayne and 
Montague (2011).
Block, N. (1986) “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10, 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Byrne, A. (2008) “Knowing That I Am Thinking,” in A. E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Byrne, A. (2011) “Transparency, Belief, Intention,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85: 201–221.
Byrne, A. and Tye, M. (2006) “Qualia Ain’t in the Head,” Noûs 40: 241–255.
Carruthers, P. and Veillet, B. (2011) “The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology,” in Bayne and Montague 
(2011).
Chalmers, D. (2004) “The Representational Character of Experience,” in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future for 
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chudnoff, E. (2015a) “Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 90: 82–104.
Chudnoff, E. (2015b) Cognitive Phenomenology, London: Routledge.
RHOC.indb   268 21-02-2018   20:04:42
Consciousness and Intentionality
269
Dretske, F. (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (1988) Explaining Behavior, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (1995) Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dretske, F. (2006) “Perception Without Awareness,” in T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual 
Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Field, H. (1977) “Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role,” Journal of Philosophy 69: 379–409.
Fodor, J. A. (1984) “Semantics, Wisconsin Style,” Synthese 59: 231–250.
Fodor, J. A. (1987) Psychosemantics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1990) “A Theory of Content,” in A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1994) The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. A. and Lepore, E. (1992) Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, Oxford: Blackwell
Fodor, J. A. and Lepore, E. (1994) “What Is the Connection Principle?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 54: 837–845.
Gennaro, R. (2012) The Consciousness Paradox, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Harman, G. (1973) Thought, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Harman, G. (1987) “(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics,” in E. Lepore (ed.), New Directions in 
Semantics, London: Academic Press.
Harman, G. (1990) “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” Philosophical Perspectives 4: 31–52.
Horgan, T. and Graham, G. (2012) “Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy,” in R. Schantz 
(ed.), Prospects for Meaning, Berlin: de Gruyter.
Horgan, T. and Kriegel, U. (2008) “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind,” The Monist 91: 
347–373.
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002) “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of 
Intentionality,” in D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Kriegel, U. (ed.) (2013) Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kriegel, U. (2015) The Varieties of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koksvik, O. (2015) “Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique,” American Philosophical Quarterly 52: 321–334.
Levine, J. (2011) “On the Phenomenology of Thought,” in Bayne and Montague (2011).
Loar, B. (1981) Mind and Meaning, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Lycan, W. G. (1996) Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McGinn, C. (1982) “The Structure of Content,” in A. Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Martin, C. B. (2008) The Mind in Nature, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Millikan, R. (1984) Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (1989) “Biosemantics,” Journal of Philosophy 86: 281–297.
Montague, M. (2016) The Given, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, G. E. (1962) “Propositions,” in Some Main Problems of Philosophy, New York: Collier Books: 66–87.
Neander, K. (1995) “Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning,” Philosophical Studies 79: 109–114.
Papineau, D. (1998) “Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 1–14.
Pautz, A. (2013) “Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?” in Kriegel (2013).
Peacocke, C. (1998) “Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge,” in C. Wright, B. C. Smith, and 
C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pitt, D. (2004) “The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What Is It Like to Think That P?”, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 69: 1–36.
Pitt, D. (2009) “Intentional Psychologism,” Philosophical Studies 146: 117–138.
Pitt, D. (2011) “Introspection, Phenomenality and the Availability of Intentional Content,” in Bayne and 
Montague (2011).
Pitt, D. (2013) “Indexical Thought,” in U. Kriegel (2013).
Pitt, D. (2017) “The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis,” Analysis 77: 735–741.
Prinz, J. (2002) Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Prinz, J. (2011) “The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology,” in Bayne and Montague (2011).
Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rupert, R. (1999) “The Best Test Theory of Extension: First Principles,” Mind and Language 14: 321–355.
Sacchi, E. and Voltolini, A. (2016) “Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology,” Rivista Internazionale 
di Filosofia e Psicologia 7: 256–263.
RHOC.indb   269 21-02-2018   20:04:42
David Pitt
270
Searle, J. (1984) Minds, Brains and Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Searle, J. (1987) “Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person,” Journal of Philosophy 84: 123–146.
Searle, J. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Siewert, C. (1998) The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Siewert, C. (2011) “Phenomenal Thought,” in Bayne and Montague (2011).
Sterelny, K. (1990) The Representational Theory of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell.
Strawson, G. (1986) Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. (1994) Mental Reality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Strawson, G. (2008) “Real Intentionality 3: Why Intentionality Entails Consciousness,” in Real Materialism 
and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. (2011) “Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life,” in Bayne and Montague (2011).
Thompson, B. (2008) “Representationalism and the Argument from Hallucination,” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 89: 384–412.
Tye, M. (2000) Consciousness, Color and Content, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. and Wright, B. (2011) “Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?” in Bayne and Montague (2011).
Related Topics
Representational Theories of Consciousness
Consciousness and Conceptualism
Dualism
Materialism
RHOC.indb   270 21-02-2018   20:04:42
